Ann Marlowe

originally published in the Libya Herald on September 12 2015: https://www.libyaherald.com/2015/09/12/op-ed-rebuilding-public-trust-in-the-libyan-government-through-financial-disclosure/

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Op-Ed: Rebuilding public trust in the Libyan government through financial disclosure

By Ann Marlowe.

12 September 2015:

The recent nomination of twelve names for two of the three top positions in Libya’s hoped–for unity government by the House of Representatives (HoR) will be debated on many grounds, but regardless of opinions on the candidates, or the selection process, this moment provides an opportunity for Libyans to rebuild trust in government. So does the upcoming end of the mandate of the internationally-recognised governing body, the HoR, which may lead to new elections.

One relatively quick fix that would have enormous positive effects would be introducing financial disclosure requirements for candidates for cabinet positions and for the legislature – including the twelve names from the HoR. Another related measure is requiring candidates who are currently civil servants or diplomats to pass muster under existing Libyan laws governing state officials.

Much recent political discussion in Libya has circled around the issue of legitimacy of political institutions (the rival HoR and General National Congress in Tripoli) and of past elections. To a lesser extent, there has been a dialogue about the legitimacy of political candidates, mainly around the issue of the 2013 Political Isolation Law. But issues that developed democracies take for granted, such as assuring the probity and financial honesty of political candidates, have been hardly addressed in Libya.

One unfortunate reaction to the Qaddafi era has been that anyone who was an opponent of the regime, even anyone who was jailed by the regime, now has built-in credibility. This neglects the fact that Qaddafi jailed many common criminals who would also have been convicted and jailed by American or English courts. The result has been that ex-cons have served, and still serve, in very high positions in Libya, with predictably bad results. This in turn has led to decreasing trust in government and the political process, resulting in the low turnout of around 18 percent in the June 2014 HoR elections.

Moving Libya from a low to a high trust society is a generational challenge. Establishing a culture of democracy, as well as a nominally democratic political system, is also the work of decades.

But increasing trust in government – and turnout in the next parliamentary elections – can be jump-started by some methods that have worked in other countries, including countries with difficult histories.

Requiring all candidates for the unity government to fill out a public financial disclosure is as new to Libya as free and fair elections, but a precedent for such a disclosure law is found in Libyan Law 3 of 1970, which requires a financial declaration by civil servants and diplomats. Article One of Law 3 states:

The holders of the public offices, judiciary and public prosecution, diplomatic corps and consulates members, officers of the armed forces and police, titled official of the government and local administration or public associations and corporations, and whoever is designated, as permanent or temporary, paid or unpaid, to public service or assumes public prosecution status, shall submit within forty five days from the date of his nomination or designation or gaining public service, a financial disclosure for himself, spouse and minor children. (http://www.aladel.gov.ly/main/modules/sections/item.php?itemid=162)

Law No 3/1970, of course, dates from very early in the Qaddafi period when corruption was not a hallmark of government.

The law could be extended from office-holders to office-seekers. To adopt to Libyan culture, disclosures could be posted on a Facebook page.

The US requires very extensive disclosure for Congressional candidates and even this has not completely kept the crooks out. But the burden of disclosure and resulting media scrutiny tends to discourage egregiously dishonest potential candidates. It would have the same effect in Libya.

The candidates would have to list all assets, companies, shareholdings, directorships and other business involvements that they have. And those who win office would have to do what American officials do: put their financial holdings in a blind trust while they are in power, and make an annual declaration of assets so it could be seen whether they were enriching themselves in office. Libyan law currently mandates that holders of high office declare their assets when entering and when leaving office.

The second measure, the requirement that all candidates be in compliance with existing Libyan laws, would have the benefit of increasing respect for the rule of law and knowledge of Libyan laws as well as eliminating those candidates who have violated the laws. It is often forgotten that Articles 77 and 78 of the Civil Service Act prohibit Libyan civil servants – including diplomats– from “engagement in business of any kind” or corporate board memberships, unless they are serving as representatives of the body they work for (e.g. an official of the LIA serving on a board on an LIA subsidiary).

This brings up another important point. Almost every Libyan says he or she wants “the rule of law”, but many Libyans are neither aware of the country’s laws nor aware of the many violations of these laws by recent political actors from all parts of the spectrum.

Anyone can look up most of Libya’s laws on this website: www.aladel.gov.ly/home/.

Libya’s economic crime laws are full of repetitions and the punishments are often absurdly weak. But they are a beginning, and they are parallel to laws in other Arab countries and to Continental law. (And no, the source of these laws is not the sharia.) Enforcing these laws would have a huge effect in dismantling a culture of impunity.

Worldwide, there is plenty of precedent for financial disclosure both by candidates for office and by office-holders..

Most countries require financial disclosure for high officials:

A more extensive World Bank survey of 176 jurisdictions completed in 2012 shows that 137 (78 percent) have financial disclosure systems. 93 percent of those countries require disclosure for cabinet members, 91 percent for members of parliament and 62 percent for high-ranking prosecutors. However, only 43 percent of countries provide the pubic with open access to public officials’ financial disclosures.

Even developing countries make this information available online:

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay have been at the forefront of efforts in Latin America to design and create electronic platforms that publish information about government officials’ personal assets (and also about procurement), according to a 2012 report by FUNDAR.

Libya has, perhaps, a second chance at a better future this autumn. Increasing the hurdles for political candidates, and increasing respect for the rule of law, can only help in the road ahead. The precedent is in Libyan laws.

The Libyan Civil Service Law
Article (77)
Combination of Employment with other Jobs
1 – A civil servant may not combine two jobs himself or through intermediation if such job may harm the performance of the duties of his profession or it is in contrary to its requirements.
2 – – A civil servant may not perform works for others , paid with salary or requital , even during the leaves or after the official work hours the unless a written permission is obtained from the competent Minister and in accordance with the cases and conditions prescribed by the Executive Regulation . The Executive Regulation shall regulate the cases in which the scientific and professional qualifications holders are permitted to perfume these professions after the official work hours.
3- The civil servant may perform , and paid with salary or requital , the of acts curatorship or guardianship or judicial assistance if the person who is under the civil servant’s guardianship or curatorship or the absent person or the person for whom the judicial assistant has been designated for, has a kinship or family relationship as to fourth degree; and he may hold in escrow the assets in which he or one of his relatives or in- laws as to fourth degree, is a partner or an interested party; and also if he is a holder in escrow in accordance with a law , provided that he shall report to the administrative units he works for.
Article (78)
Prohibitions
The civil servant himself or through intermediation is prohibited from conducting any of the prohibited and banned activities prescribed by the valid laws or regulations or statues and particularly prohibited from:
A) Buying real estate or movables which the administrative or judicial authorities put up for sale at the entity where he works.
B) Engagement in businesses of any kind, or having interest in bids or auctions or contracting, or tenders related to his work.
C) Act to get in on the establishment of companies or to accept the membership of its board or any position in the company except when he acts as a delegate of one of the administrative unites or obtains the license for the membership or work from the competent body.
D) Renting, with an intention to exploit in the entity where he works, real estate or movables if such exploitation is related to his work.

END

Ann Marlowe is a writer and visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute and a consultant to a branch of the Libyan state that is neutral in the current conflict.

(originally published in The Weekly Standard, May 1 2015 http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/libyans-plead-american-help_935209.html)
Midwifing democracy is not an Obama priority.
May 11, 2015, Vol. 20, No. 33 • By ANN MARLOWE
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‘Why does the United States fight terror in Syria, Iraq, and Africa but not in Libya?” Idris al Magreibi, 40, a tall, lightly bearded member of Libya’s House of Representatives in Tobruk, was pacing the floor in the offices of the Libyan Mission to the United Nations as he raised the question. He spoke in Arabic, and a member of the mission served as interpreter.
From left: Tarek Alashtar, Idris al Magreibi, and Essa al Arabi

From left: Tarek Alashtar, Idris al Magreibi, and Essa al Arabi

Ann Marlowe

Magreibi and his colleagues Essa al Arabi, also 40, and Tarek Alashtar, 35, were among 12 Libyan legislators visiting Washington and New York last week in an effort to win American support for the internationally recognized Tobruk government. Its House of Representatives—elected in free and fair elections in June 2014 and known as the HoR—is now battling the Islamic State (ISIS), Ansar al Sharia, and a rival coalition of Islamist militias known as Fajr (Dawn) that seized Tripoli last August.

The three are bright, high-energy advocates for the kind of government the United States thought Libya would get after the 2011 revolution: committed to elections, representative democracy, the modern world, and resistance to the Muslim Brotherhood and more extreme groups with a foothold in North Africa.

What they want from the United States is, most controversially, a further loosening of the already-relaxed U.N. arms ban on their government so that they can pursue the worthy objective of fighting ISIS and Ansar al Sharia. Many international observers worry that the weaponry would also be used against their Tripoli rivals. The Libyans point out, however, that Fajr is already supplying Ansar with arms.

The delegation also wants the United States to help train the Libyan National Army and police. (That was supposed to happen a couple of years ago but never got off the ground.) Two of the three I met—Arabi and Magreibi—as well as the HoR as a whole, asked for U.S. airstrikes on terror groups like ISIS and Ansar al Sharia, but none of the three wants U.S. boots on the ground.

The visitors can’t quite believe how little traction they are getting in Washington for requests they see as in America’s interest as well as theirs. Arabi, who represents a district in Benghazi still threatened by terrorists, noted, “A lot of people in Libya think that the United States is supporting the Muslim Brotherhood.” This may be because American support for the HoR has been, in the words of Libyan civil society activist Ayat Mneina, at best “decorative.”

How did we get here? Libyans voted for their first national assembly in July 2012. This General National Congress proved a disaster—corrupt, incapable, and unwilling to relinquish authority to its successor body, the 188-seat HoR. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties did very poorly in the 2014 election and rejected its results.

During this period, militias were proliferating across the country. The General National Congress tried to pay them off. In Tripoli, rivalry between brigades from the mountain town of Zintan and the coastal city of Misrata erupted into open warfare for control of the airport.

In August, the Brotherhood struck back. Fajr took control of Tripoli airport, forcing the HoR to flee to Tobruk, on the coast near the Egyptian border. The Zintan militia retreated south into the Nafusa Mountains and has been engaged in a low-intensity conflict to regain territory ever since.

Now the HoR governs the eastern half of the country, some areas around Zintan, and part of the sparsely inhabited south. Its military is steadily gaining ground in an operation to recover control of western Libya. A few days after my interview, Fajr announced a truce with crucial tribes in the hinterland south of Tripoli, and at least one Misrata militia that had been fighting the Libyan National Army there agreed to pack up and go home.

In Tripoli, the rump General National Congress maintains a tenuous grip on power. Its radical Islamist prime minister, Omar al Hassi, was forced out a couple of weeks ago; he was once a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an al Qaeda ally.

Fajr isn’t quite the Taliban, but almost. Hassi was given to praising Ansar al Sharia, which is still supplied by Misrata militias and is the group that murdered U.S. ambassador Chris Stevens on September 12, 2012. Hassi also denied that the ISIS execution videos showing the murder of 21 Coptic Christians were real.

Fajr has vandalized or removed all of the figurative statues that once adorned Tripoli and routinely destroys Sufi shrines. Under its influence, the Tripoli government has segregated girls and boys even in primary school. That said, many Fajr supporters reject these actions, yet still believe their city’s interests are best served by Fajr. The Berber town of Zwara, for instance, supports Fajr because it opposes their traditional Arab enemies in surrounding towns.

Even as the militias fight, U.N.-brokered talks to form a unity government have been moving steadily forward. The idea is that both the prime minister and cabinet picked by the HoR and those chosen by the Tripoli contingent would resign, and a new slate acceptable to all would replace them.

As of this week, the U.N. proposal would designate the HoR the legitimate legislature—unacceptable to Fajr but an absolute requirement for members of the HoR. As Tarek Alashtar put it, “It’s okay to have a coalition government, but the will of the people is in the House of Representatives. If we don’t respect the people’s will, we leave it open in the future for any armed group to do the same.”

Like the Libyan population generally, the MPs I met with are young. According to the CIA World Factbook, 44 percent of Libyans are under 24, and 70 percent are under 35. As a result of widespread disgust with Qaddafi-era power brokers, Libya’s young voters tend to support young politicians. They’re more tech-savvy than their elders—they’ve graduated from faxes to computers—but with no experience of democracy, they are building the plane as they are flying it.

None of the three I met with has much political experience. Idris al Magreibi, whose district is in the oil port of Brega, has spent his adult life in construction and agribusiness. Though active in civil society groups after the revolution, he was content to leave politics to others. Then the GNC’s disastrous reign began. “I thought everything would go well, but the people in power had other agendas. They were not working on building a country or civil society. Instead they were working with [extremists] in Mali, Syria, and Iraq.”

Magreibi stressed that his constituents are comparatively well off. “Most of the people in Brega work for oil companies,” he said. “There are some shortages of bread and fuel, but necessities are 60-65 percent available.” It speaks volumes that this is considered a “good” situation in today’s Libya.

Essa al Arabi was formerly manager of medical affairs at the HIV Center in Benghazi. He got involved in the revolution, which started in Benghazi, early on. He sat out the first Libyan parliamentary elections in 2012 but decided to run in 2014 because he was disappointed in the quality of the GNC and alarmed by the rise of Ansar al Sharia and the epidemic of assassinations and kidnappings in Benghazi. At least 250 and possibly as many as 600 Libyans were assassinated by Ansar and other terror groups in Benghazi and Derna in 2014.

What happened that fall—a frontal assault on the militias by General Khalifa Haftar—is controversial among Libyans. Haftar held no regular army position post-Qaddafi until he was appointed commander in chief of the Libyan National Army in March 2015. He has still not completely rid Benghazi of Ansar, though the assassinations have stopped, and most of the city is now under army and police control.

The HoR was supposed to sit in Benghazi, but that city is still too dangerous, hence its present location in Tobruk, a small, boring town far from everywhere. Many representatives spend weekends in places like Cairo or Tunis with their families, especially if their districts are controlled by Fajr or threatened by ISIS and its allies.

Magreibi lives in his district, but Arabi can’t live in Benghazi. And Tarek Alashtar can’t even visit his district in Tripoli while it’s ruled by Fajr. His family lives a couple of hours away, across the Tunisian border. He communicates with his constituents in the Abu Salim district of Tripoli mainly by Facebook (huge in Libya) and phone, even though phone and Internet communications are monitored by Fajr, he says, as they were under Qaddafi.

The three politicians’ time in the United States was drawing to a close as we spoke, and they said they’d enjoyed their trip, especially Washington, which they preferred to New York (very congested by Libyan standards).

A few days later, I got a press release in Arabic from the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing satisfaction with the visit. It said that the delegation had met with officials at the White House, State Department, Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, USAID, and unnamed congressional leaders. The American authorities had shown “an understanding of the current situation in Libya, and reiterated [their] commitment to support the democratic process in Libya and to respect the will and choice of the Libyan people.”

By now, though, Americans know that under the Obama administration, this isn’t likely to translate into the support a fragile new democracy needs.