ann marlow

Ann Marlowe is a writer and businesswoman based in New York City. A Visiting Fellow of the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C., she travels frequently to Afghanistan and publishes often on Afghanistan's politics, economy, culture and the U.S. military counterinsurgency strategy there, primarily in The Wall Street Journal, Weekly Standard, and Forbes.com.

Ms. Marlowe also writes about American politics, the war on terror, and the relationship of women to money, power, and work. In the 90s, she published frequently on rock, rap and blues music and youth culture.

Her articles have also appeared in Artforum, Bookforum, LA Weekly, National Review Online, the New York Post op ed pages, the New York Times Book Review, the San Francisco Chronicle book pages, the Village Voice, VIBE, The Washington Post and World Affairs.

Ms. Marlowe is the author of two memoirs, the critically acclaimed How to Stop Time: Heroin from A to Z (Basic, 1999 and Virago, 1999) and The Book of Trouble: A Romance (Harcourt, 2006). Both have been translated into foreign languages. She is also one of the contributers to A New Literary History of America (Harvard, 2009).

Ms. Marlowe has been interviewed extensively on radio about Afghanistan and her books and is a regular guest on the John Batchelor radio show discussing Afghanistan and counterinsurgency. She has also spoken to the U.S. Army, Army War College, State Department and college students on Afghanistan and addressed industry panels and college classes on popular music. In January, 2009, Ms. Marlowe was a Media Fellow at the Hoover Institution, working on an article on the origins of counterinsurgency theory which appeared in the Summer 2009 issue of World Affairs. In 2010, she is blogging for World Affairs under the title, "Peace Later!", on the juncture of art and war. Her blog is at http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/marlowe.

Ms. Marlowe was born in Suffern, New York and educated at public schools in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. She received her B.A. in philosophy magna cum laude from Harvard University in 1979 and studied classical philosophy there in the Ph.D. program in 1979-80. In 1984, she received an MBA in finance from Columbia University's Graduate School of Business.

Recent Articles:

In Plain Sight The evolutionary instinct to disguise and deceive

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originally published in The Weekly Standard, March 8, 2010, Vol. 15, No. 24

http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/plain-sight

Dazzled and Deceived

Mimicry and Camouflage
by Peter Forbes
Yale, 304 pp., $27.50

When I began Dazzled and Deceived I was disappointed to see that I’d have to read five chapters on mimicry in the natural world before I got to my particular interest, military camouflage in the First and Second World Wars. Five chapters on insects? What motivated me to pick up Dazzled was the question of why the world’s militaries rather suddenly developed an interest in disguising themselves around the time of World War I.

But I found myself caught up in British nature writer (and poetry editor) Peter Forbes’s account of the late 19th-century fascination with mimicry and the way it influenced Darwin’s theory of natural selection. The late 19th century was the golden age of mimicry, and some imitative species discovered in the early 19th century, like living stone plants, received more attention a hundred years later.

Are there reasons beyond biology why this might be so? I wish Forbes had pushed harder to tease out the intellectual history and cultural context in which interest in mimicry came to the fore. Perhaps part of the answer is the invention of photography and the divergence of painting from pure representation? But Forbes, the author of The Gecko’s Foot (2005), is more interested in nature. He explains how mimicry raised the ultimate philosophical questions in Victorian biology: What are variations, hybrids, and species? What is the role of warning coloration versus sexual selection in evolution? Occasional mutations of harmless butterflies that looked like neighboring toxic species were favored by natural selection, and eventually evolved into distinct mimic species. In some places, several different toxic species all looked alike.

In many cases, good explanations had to await the discovery of DNA. Some mysteries are still being unraveled. I never knew, for instance, that insects see beyond the color spectrum we can see, all the way to the ultraviolet. In ultraviolet light, the Australian white crab spider is highly visible to bees, and flowers where it perches seem more brilliant and enticing. But local bees are catching on to the game and avoiding super-white flowers. That’s evolution in action. Or consider that mimetic butterflies inherit a mating preference for others who look like them. The spinning-out of this particular story raises fundamental issues about what a species is.
click here

Forbes has convinced me that, without a grounding in the natural origins of human-designed camouflage, I’d have a superficial understanding of the intellectual history of this aspect of warfare. Knowing that concealment strategies in nature were all the rage in late 19th-century biology, it’s not surprising to learn that several thinkers simultaneously came up with the idea of disguising ships from attack. More interesting still, the strategies these men advocated for ship camouflage often derived from their theories about how concealment worked in nature.

The most important camoufleur was a puritanical, obsessive New England painter, Abbott Handerson Thayer. The eponymous Thayer’s Law refers to countershading, “the gradation between the back and the belly of an animal.” Thayer saw countershading everywhere in nature, and warning coloration nowhere, which influenced his military ideas. When the Spanish-American War began in 1898, he advised the Navy on disguising ships (although it wasn’t done), and in 1902, he patented the idea of applying countershading—upward facing parts darker, downward facing parts white—to naval vessels. Thayer also identified what would come to be known as disruptive coloration, which was applied in World War I as “dazzle” painting.

As Forbes explains disruptive coloration:

By breaking the shape of the creature into large, seemingly random patches of colour, the characteristic outline of the creature can to some extent be obscured. As humans are large creatures, and their artifacts often larger still, this principle is more important in human camouflage than attempts at total invisibility.

The Scottish zoologist John Graham Kerr had noticed in 1895 that the then-standard battleship gray for ships “falls short of what is attained by nature” by way of disguise. In September 1914 he wrote to Winston Churchill, first lord of the Admiralty, about his method for disguising ships, and his ideas were considered—but eventually the navy decided that gray was still the best option given the varying times of day, degrees of light, and times of year with which ships must contend.

A third figure, an English marine painter named Norman Wilkinson, apparently without knowledge of camouflage in nature, also advocated breaking up the outline of ships by painting them in black and white stripes. A lifelong sailor, he’d joined the Royal Navy at the outbreak of World War I and, by 1917, was bitten by the “dazzle” bug as well.

Each had slightly different goals: Wilkinson hoped to make ships harder to hit by torpedos when sighted by submarines; Kerr thought in terms of avoiding gun attack; Thayer thought white made ships nearly invisible (or made icebergs invisible at night, as the Titanic crew discovered). These goals would be debated after the war, when Kerr and Wilkinson competed to be known as the originator of dazzle; but it was Norman Wilkinson, charismatic and socially skilled, who was tasked by the navy to set up a camo unit.

One of the painters Wilkinson recruited was Edward Wadsworth, a British vorticist. I happened to see two of his black-and-white World War I-era woodcuts of dazzle ships (“Dock Scene” and “Liverpool Shipping”) in an exhibit in Miami’s Wolfsonian Museum while reading Forbes’s book and was struck by the way dazzle seemed so dated, so of its time. Exuberant Vorticist evocations of what then was experienced as modernity, they are now as obviously picturesque as Canalettos.

Forbes is clear that dazzle was almost as much a cultural artifact as a useful military tactic. Ship camouflage didn’t turn out to be very effective: In a Royal Navy study of the 2,367 ships that were painted with dazzle, it was found that more were attacked and more lost or damaged, but slightly fewer of these were sunk. So the usefulness of dazzle was inconclusive, although an American study of 1,256 camouflaged ships showed slightly better results for dazzle. But then, as the Israeli military theorist Martin van Creveld puts it, “In any particular kind of war, the meaning of ‘victory’ is decided as much by convention—tacit or explicit—as it is by actual physical results.”

By the time of the Great War, camouflage was in the zeitgeist—whether or not it worked. Forbes points out the “connection between disruptive coloration and cubism’s breaking up of the outline into facets.” But Thayer, Wilkinson, and Kerr, at least in Forbes’s account, made nothing of it. It was Picasso, in Gertrude Stein’s famous testimony, who noted the link, reacting to a camouflaged truck in Paris at the start of the war by claiming, “Yes it is we who made it, that is cubism.”

Forbes also makes a novel point about cubism and camouflage:

The tendency towards colour for colour’s sake, so notable in many of these [avant-garde] movements, was reversed in cubism. The palette was, more or less entirely, muddy greens and browns—earth colours, camouflage colours.

Interestingly enough, while ships and gun emplacements were painted with camouflage or disruptive designs, only snipers wore camo in World War I
and the general run of combatants were not garbed in camo, even in World War II. (Part of the reason is that it was hard to mass-produce.) Abbott Thayer was an early proponent of disguising military uniforms, harassing the War Office on the subject; but the snipers’ uniforms worn after 1916 were derived from Scottish deerstalkers’ gillies!

Oddly enough, Forbes doesn’t cite a 2002 book by Roy Behrens, False Colors: Art, Design and Modern Camouflage. Behrens discusses the use of camo in the two World Wars, with profuse illustrations and some fascinating discussions of modern art that go beyond Forbes’s examples.

Mimicry in flora and fauna may be innately fascinating to humans because we are mimics from babyhood. And mimicry is related to mimesis, representation, the source of all human communication, art, and learning. Louis Menand wrote recently that “[Marcel] Duchamp eliminated the element of imitation in art, and [Andy] Warhol imitated him.” It’s an insight that resonates more fully after reading Dazzled and Deceived.

A SOLDIER’S STORY

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originally published in the New York Post 2/14/2010

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/soldier_story_BuPwxrlCouHPi3odiNwuHK

It’s a very difficult moral dilemma, to weigh the life of a young man of great promise against the chance of Afghan children to go to school and gain the chance of entrée to a larger world than their poor farming villages.

But an outstanding 28-year-old Army officer, Captain Daniel P. Whitten of Grimes, Iowa, beloved husband, son and brother, chose to put his life in this balance.

He was killed by an improvised explosive device on Feb. 2 in Zabul Province, Afghanistan.

I met Dan in late November 2009 while embedded with the military in Zabul, where he lead Charlie Company of the 508th PIR, 82nd Airborne Division. For three days, I trailed Dan and some of his subordinates as they prepared for an air assault on a dusty Ghazni town, Faisabad.

Dan was full of good humor and vitality, and seemed to relish almost every aspect of his job. It wasn?t an easy one ? commanding a company of 120 paratroopers spread out over four remote combat outposts, many hours drive from other American bases. In my time with Dan?s men, I stayed at a forward operating base called Nawbahar, which was a 19th century British mud brick fort out of the movies. There was no running water, just a well; no toilets, just burn bags; and the paratroopers slept in extremely cramped quarters. Yet they enjoyed their life.

Something civilians often don?t understand ? and I didn?t until I did embeds ? is that a lot of men in their twenties enjoy living in rough conditions in the middle of nowhere, as long as they are given responsibility and have the sense that they are doing meaningful work. Dan seemed to me to have found a calling ideally suited to his temperament; he seemed sure of his purpose in a way few of us are, especially so young.

Dan was special, even among the high caliber of officers I knew from the 82nd Airborne, almost all of whom are Army Rangers. Tall, big-boned and handsome, he had the West Pointer?s confidence and the ideal American officer?s ability to put others first. He had already earned two Bronze Stars for his efforts. Yet when it came time to edit my article, I realized I had far more material on Dan?s subordinates than him. That was as he?d intended.

Dan was kind and witty and socially at ease, and remembered everything I told him. We?d talked about my writing on Afghan archeology, and so, in the helicopter that took us back from Faisabad, he drew my attention to a mysterious large tower he had passed on previous trips. I could tell at once that it was very old. This tower isn?t known to Afghan archeologists: Dan?s sharp eyes and intellectual curiousity may have made a discovery.

According to Capt. Derrick B. Hernandez of the 1-508, Dan and his men had finished a three-day operation on the Ghazni Province border when his Humvee struck an IED that wounded one of his men.

?Dan then jumped into another vehicle and recovered his original vehicle. Seven kilometers later, his truck again struck another IED, this one instantly killing Dan and Pfc. Zachary Lovejoy and seriously wounding three others.?

Dan died doing work that had meaning to him. As Derrick pointed out in a speech he gave at Dan?s memorial in Zabul, Dan could have had any assignment he wanted. He chose to return with 1-508 to one of the most remote and insecure places in Afghanistan.

On his first Afgthan deployment Dan was aide-de-camp to Major Gen. Joe Votel, and was marked for a bright future. Gen. David Petraeus was among those at Dan?s funeral in a packed Cadet Chapel this Friday at West Point, Votel said Dan had the ability to ?make the unbearable bearable.? Unfortunately no one was around to do that on Friday.

I don?t know how many people in Southern Afghanistan appreciate what our military are doing over there; some mutter that the US is in Afghanistan because we want their land. What?s certain is that it?s only in areas with an American presence that government schools are operating in Zabul.

Dan knew there was a significant risk that he would be killed more or less at random, without the chance to meet his enemies in a fair fight. He was murdered by evil men who literally want to keep the people of Afghanistan in the Dark Ages.

We have lost 696 men like Dan in Afghanistan. I would suggest that one way to honor them is not to enter into negotiations with his murderers, or to give Afghanistan back to them.

Lurching Toward Disaster in Afghanistan

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originally published in The Wall Street Journal, 2/4/2010 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703389004575033222236113024.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopOpinion

We are rapidly lurching toward disaster in Afghanistan. We’re on the brink of losing the country, not to mention the lives of some of our finest young men and women.

Between the spring of 2002 and 2006, I saw nothing but progress. Afghanistan never would be Switzerland, but it was on the road to becoming a normal developing country.

But from last year to this, we have made the wrong choice at a number of junctions.

First, we allowed a fraudulent election to occur. Worse, we allowed Abdullah Abdullah to think we did not back his candidacy, pushing him to withdraw from the runoff he had earned. Under Mr. Abdullah, Afghanistan would have had a chance for a fresh start.

Many said that Mr. Abdullah, as a non-Pashtun, couldn’t rule Afghanistan. Well, they used to say a non-Sunni couldn’t rule Iraq. Non-Pashtuns are 60% of the Afghan people. It’s time one of them had a chance to rule.

In his State of the Union address, President Obama claimed, “We will reward good governance, reduce corruption, and support the rights of all Afghans—men and women alike.” Starting when?

A second mistake was when Mr. Obama decided that sending more troops was the answer but spent little time figuring out what these troops were supposed to do. Are security problems best addressed through military action, or could we accomplish more with tribal leverage and improved governance? This remains unexplored.

A third problem is that the timetable laid out by Mr. Obama and Gen. Stanley McChrystal ignores the clear unreadiness of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to take over security responsibilities. The commanders I’ve talked with in Southern Afghanistan estimate that it will take at least three years for the ANA to fly solo, and longer for the police. So why is Mr. Obama still referring to July 2011 as the date the ANA can take over?

A fourth mistake: Last week, we caved in to the Pakistanis yet again. We pledged to give them aid and even drones, even as they say they’re not mounting any more assaults on the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas this year.

Fifth, and worst, Gen. McChrystal seems to be doing his best to hearten the insurgency and dismay Afghan progressives. Our commanding general told the Financial Times last week that the point of the surge was to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, rather than clearing and holding insurgent-ridden areas of Afghanistan.

Gen. McChrystal gets it wrong on other issues. He envisions Pakistan—a country that provides sanctuary to the Taliban—as a facilitator of talks, though most Afghans believe Pakistan is trying to destabilize their country. He imagines the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia—both the source of dubious charities that fund the insurgency—as venues for the talks. And he remarks that insurgent leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is “most likely to cut a deal,” noting that he is a “former prime minister.”

Hekmatyar is better known as a psychopath who began his political career by throwing acid in the faces of female students when he attended Kabul University in the 1970s. He’s on our list of international terrorists and should be captured or killed—not negotiated with.

Happily, some officials see the situation for what it is, as shown by the recently leaked November cables from U.S. Ambassador (and retired Lt. Gen.) Karl Eikenberry to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In his Nov. 6 and 10 cables, Mr. Eikenberry wrote: “More troops won’t end the insurgency as long as Pakistan sanctuaries remain.” I was told in November by Lt. Col. Dave Oclander, a battalion commander of the 82nd Airborne in Zabul province, that about a third of the insurgents are in Pakistan on R&R at any given time—a luxury our troops and the ANA don’t have.

The ambassador suggested that the administration invest in development (electricity, water and education) and governance, since they are a direct path to stabilizing the country. He deplored “further militarization of our effort, instead of civilianization and Afghanization which are our real aims.”

When the American Embassy requested $2.5 billion for the budget for development and governance last summer, the request was rejected. But the surge will cost perhaps 10 or 20 times that much annually, without building a government Afghans can trust. Why should we send 30,000 more Americans to hand over the country to its worst elements?