Archive for September, 2011

Democracy In Libya (orig. pub. Weekly Standard, 8/29/11)

Sunday, September 11th, 2011

http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/democracy-libya_590439.html

Democracy in Libya
The unintended benefits of a protracted conflict
Ann Marlowe
August 29, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 46

Benghazi, Libya

What was supposed to be a short police action by NATO has turned into a protracted conflict, but the Libyan people may be the long-term beneficiaries of the unexpectedly long war here. In the Western Mountains, hit hard by the conflict, Abdul al-Razaq, an oilfield technician from Sabratha before the war, explained from his brigade headquarters in Zintan: “In Tunisia and Egypt the revolutions were from the top. They changed their president. In Libya, our revolution has started from the bottom.” The need—and time—to rethink institutions from the bottom has given democracy the space to trickle upward in Libya.

“The Islamists here say that liberals have a right to their opinions. Oh, what a nice gift!” Idris Tayeb says caustically in English. It’s early afternoon in Benghazi on August 8, and as the whipsmart former Libyan cultural attaché to Rome and New Delhi sits in his office in the National Transitional Council’s Foreign Affairs Office, seismic changes are taking place in the often-inscrutable council itself.

By evening, council head Dr. Mahmoud Jibril will announce what looks like a major power shift, disbanding the council’s executive committee and promising a replacement. Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, the second-in-command and head of the executive committee, will be among those suspended.

The ferment is in reaction to the council’s findings of administrative errors in the gruesome murder on July 28 of the revolutionaries’ top military commander, Major Abdul Fattah Younes. A separate criminal inquiry is winding its way to a conclusion more slowly, trying to explain to the satisfaction of Benghazi’s people and the general’s million-strong Obeidat tribe how he ended up dead when he was supposed to be appearing before the council to answer questions about his conduct of the war.

Though the still-mysterious killing has taken the bloom off the council—newly recognized by Washington and London as Libya’s legitimate government—-Benghazi’s people are looking encouragingly like the citizens of a democracy. The agitation here is conversational. While the revolution began with demonstrations in what is now known as “Freedom Square” in mid-February, it is moving on to the beginnings of party politics.

A half-dozen political organizations are in the process of formation, each with an anodyne platform and position papers, and activity has picked up since Abdul Fattah’s death. The cavernous triple-height lobby of Benghazi’s sole five-star hotel, the fortress-like, usually stiflingly hot Tibesti, is filled much of the day with Libyan politicos talking through their views and plans. While there are opportunists and cynics, many of the men and women meeting here are highly educated—often in the United States or Britain—and passionately committed to their country.

There is much grumbling about the council. Some political insiders, like Salwa Bugaighis, a member of a wealthy Benghazi clan active in the revolution, note that the council’s lack of transparency and indecisiveness reflect the dictatorship it emerged from. Bugaighis, an attorney involved since the earliest days of the revolution, explains that “for 42 years, the decision maker was Qaddafi. People used to take the decisions from up [above]. They are always afraid to make a decision.” She also noted that Jalil is a “nice, very flexible man” known for avoiding conflict and seeking consensual decisions. “But now we are in crisis. He doesn’t want to anger anyone.”

Mohammed al-Senussi is one of a much smaller number advocating the surprisingly controversial step of electing a council now. “We have to choose our representatives democratically before democracies unwisely recognize a travesty.” A grandnephew of Libya’s King Idris, who was deposed by Qaddafi in 1969, Senussi advocates elections in Libya’s free cities to obtain a new council, then a temporary assembly to choose a committee to write a new constitution. But the stock objection to this position—that elections in free areas would be unfair to people in not-yet-liberated cities and would be a distraction from the war effort—still has overwhelming support in Benghazi.

The role of Islam in a free Libya is one of the hot topics in this almost wholly Muslim country. Former deputy executive committee head Ali al-Essawi—who signed the warrant for Abdul Fattah’s arrest on charges of treason—is widely said to be sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, so his removal may represent a shift away from toleration of a growing Islamist influence.

But a fully secular Libyan state is hard to imagine. Idris Tayeb is rare in the extent of his commitment to the separation of religion from government. “Idris may be too far left for many Libyans,” says S. Ghariani, the measured, calm spokesman for the new National Democratic Association (NDA). “We are an Islamic country.”

Tayeb, imprisoned from 1978 to 1988 on charges of heading Libya’s Communists, admits to having been known as the “Marxist sheikh.” (He was termed a “sheikh” in deference to his having completed a traditional Islamic scholar’s education; by the age of 12 he had memorized the Koran.) Tayeb and the NDA had considered an alliance, but ultimately the NDA found him too controversial for what they hope will evolve into a secular political party with broad mainstream support. So a week ago, Tayeb launched his own Libyan Democratic Front to advocate a “100 percent democratic state” with no mention of Islam as a foundation for government.

This would likely have been a nonstarter even a few months ago; the watchword of the revolution of the 17th of February was an almost uncritical inclusiveness. But it’s easier to advocate today, as Libyans reassess and regroup. There is resentment of the well-organized Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, whose members have returned from exile overseas in recent months. A young man who provided security in Benghazi from the first days of the revolution complained that after the NATO bombing campaign saved Benghazi from a March 19 assault by Qaddafi’s forces, “these [exile] people came, but we paid the price.”

There’s much grumbling about this or another group “stealing the revolution.” Tayeb downplays the complaints: “This requires three elements: a revolution, its owner, and a thief.” But he is among an increasing number raising another hitherto taboo subject, the influence of Qatar here.

The small Gulf nation provided the uniforms of -Libya’s revolutionary army and police and many of its assault rifles and 4×4 vehicles. Qataris trained some of the volunteers, and Qatar’s Al Jazeera network has covered the revolution almost nonstop. But now people remember that Al Jazeera waited till the revolution was underway to cover Libyan opposition to Qaddafi. “For five years they did not report anything about opposition in Libya. We were emailing them for years,” says Iman Bugaighis, a Benghazi dental professor who was until recently a civilian spokeswoman for the Council.

“There is a Qatar agenda,” Tayeb says. “They want to play the role of regional representative in the world. They are selling the Muslim Brothers to the West as the only alternative to extremists—and they are arming the extremists just to show the need for the Muslim Brothers.” He goes on to draw an analogy with the West’s support of dictators in the Arab world in a false dichotomy between democracy and stability. (Today, it seems Washington is bending over backwards not to criticize Libya’s Islamists, whether out of some realpolitik calculation, or because it believes, to paraphrase the Turkish writer Melik Kaylan, that inside every Muslim is a more religious Muslim struggling to get out.)

Tayeb is among those concerned about the influence of Ali al-Sallabi, one of an important family of eight brothers and three sisters. Ali worked with Seif al-Islam Qaddafi, the dictator’s second and most powerful son, to get Libya’s jihadist prisoners released before the revolution, including some former Guantánamo inmates. Long an exile in Qatar, he has funneled weapons from that country to Libya’s revolutionaries—but some charge they have also gone to the much smaller group of Islamic extremists. Tayeb is infuriated by Sallabi’s appropriation of a leadership role in a revolution he parachuted in on. “All the time he uses the word ‘we.’ Finally I said to him, Why don’t you learn to use the word ‘I’?”

Ali was in Qatar and unavailable for an interview, but his sister Aisha says that while he is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and that the family supports the organization, Ali is a moderate Muslim. Regarding the jihadist prisoners, Aisha insists that Ali had some conversations with them and that they had changed their violent views before he negotiated their release.

Aisha was gracious and calm in the face of my insistent questioning. Her husband, it turns out, is a cousin of Ghariani’s wife Hazar Ben Ali, a founding member of the National Democratic Association. Hazar, in turn, is a second cousin of NDA founding member Fairouz Nas. -Libya’s elites are so close-knit that blood ties link just about everyone in the political sphere. A Benghazi dentistry student, Salmeen Al Jawhary, explained to me that merely from their last names she could identify the hometown of just about any Libyan.

“A lot of people who called themselves independent are reconsidering their positions,” Ghariani says. Fairouz Nas, a Tripoli accounting professor from a prominent Benghazi family and one of the NDA’s 23 founders, was originally loath to form an association, she says. “But then there were problems like the wall in Makama that I could not solve by myself.” This is a reference to a ten-foot-high wall put up around the women’s section in “Freedom Square” to “protect” the women from the male gaze and supposed harassment. It is despised by many of the more educated women.

The NDA is holding frequent public meetings to recruit members. They are trying to attract the young people who made the revolution and represent by far the majority of Libya’s six million citizens. And they are sensitive to the need to be democratic within their organization as well as in its platform. Nas explained that they had a poll for youth where 250 invited young people sat at roundtables with NDA members and shared their views in an informal polling process.

The NDA are proposing a free-market economy, free health care for Libyans, and free education (these last two existed under Qaddafi, but were of low quality). They are hesitant to label themselves a party just yet, since Qaddafi spent decades insisting that anyone “who is a party member is a traitor”—a slogan internalized even by his opponents. “Young people came to us and said, ‘Don’t call yourself a party,’ ” says Nas.

The role of women is being debated here too, with Amal Bugaighis, another prominent attorney, forming the Committee for the Support of Women in Decision Making with 24 other women at the end of June. Now numbering around 200, it’s not a party, but a group of well-educated women aiming to open up a discussion of women’s roles in Libyan society. Nas says she considered joining, but balked at a point in their platform calling for a quota of 30 percent women in future political bodies.

Libya’s youth, who transformed a meek Benghazi lawyers’ union “standing protest” on February 15 into a violent uprising, are also trying to put their stamp on organized politics. El Montasir, a skinny, outgoing 19-year-old electrical engineering student in camo pants, a techno T-shirt, and a red soldier’s beret, calls himself a “Libocrat”—a Libyan committed to democracy. He is the head of the Association of the Voice of National Youth (“Libocrats” might work better), which he claims has 12,000 to 13,000 members all over the country, including in Qaddafi-held areas.

Like many Libyans, El Montasir avows, “We believe the U.S. [is the] best country in the world.” Also like many Libyans, he has a close relative in the United States. But it is hard to find out what the group’s platform entails beyond lots of enthusiasm for democracy. More seasoned politicos told me that El Montasir—a nom de guerre that means “the conqueror”—was strongly opposed to the Islamists. But religion permeates his thought, or at least his speech.

“I am doing this for Allah and my country,” he explains in the Tibesti lobby—probably the youngest person among a hundred or so talking politics one midnight. And he interpolates profuse thanks to Allah in his account of his own involvement in the revolution, in rapid but often incorrect English.

A clearer explanation of what his group does came from a middle-aged adviser to the Voice of the Youth, a successful Libyan-American businessman, Mustafa Gheriani: “This group is operating in the least privileged areas in Benghazi, and the surrounding cities and villages. Some of the Voice of the Youth have played a major role in the development of Benghazi’s 60 neighborhood councils. The Voice of the Youth platform is a work in progress.”

The fervent love of country of Libyans of all stripes is a distinguishing feature of the Libyan revolution. Perhaps it is because this is a small population, but Libyans have a sense of ownership that augurs well for the future.

“This is my country, don’t put it under your shoes,” Idris Tayeb wrote in a 1986 poem while inside Tripoli’s Abu Salim prison. (He translated his verse into English and published it earlier this year in Egypt.) Since February, such once-forbidden sentiments have become almost universal. Over more than six trying months of death, brownouts, shortages, and confusion, Libyans have gone from viewing their country as the property of one man to the responsibility of all.

Back to School in Libya (orig. pub. Wall Street Journal, 8/16/11)

Sunday, September 11th, 2011

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903480904576510212578592514.html

Back to School in Liberated Libya

‘I still remember the day they burned the English books at my school.’
By ANN MARLOWE

Benghazi

While foreign observers focus on the internecine struggles of Free Libya’s Transitional National Council, much more profound developments are under way here. The crippled Libyan educational system molded by Gadhafi’s 42-year rule is being retooled to “build the principles of democracy,” says the council’s education minister, Suliman el Sahli. On Sept. 5, he and his colleagues in the Education Working Group plan what he calls a “soft re-opening” of primary and secondary schools, rolling out from Benghazi to other areas of liberated Libya.

They face a massive task. Nearly everything was wrong with Libyan education at the start of the Feb. 17 revolution. Not just because of underfunding, which led to overcrowding (Gadhafi had virtually stopped school construction from the late 1980s until 2010) and abysmal teacher salaries (not raised in years, and often not a living wage).

Gadhafi’s practice of making all decisions from the top, often impulsively and with no systemization, led to an educational culture in which administrators and teachers had little idea of what to expect from one week to the next. As de facto mouthpieces—some willing and some not—for the regime, they were often scorned, much in contrast to traditional Arab veneration of the teacher.

Five months of war have added new problems and practical obstacles to reopening the schools. The grimmest concern is to provide support for students who have lost family members or witnessed atrocities by Gadhafi’s troops. Another is a mine-awareness campaign that has so far trained 280 teachers to help children avoid mines planted by Gadhafi’s forces (the revolutionary government has forsworn the use of mines).

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Earlier this year, many teachers, parents and even older high-school students were doing volunteer work supporting the nascent Free Libyan government or, if they were men over 18, fighting on the front lines. As the action moved west and eastern Libya returned to relative stability, financial problems moved to the fore. With oil production disrupted, the new revolutionary government has been chronically short of funds, unable to pay teachers. Electricity has been an issue. Many here fear that Gadhafi still has sleeper cells in the liberated areas, and that attacks on schools are a possibility. Fourteen hundred guards are being trained (though they will be unarmed).

Despite all this, the council is determined to open schools in September—without the Green Book-inflected ideology and with an aim to changing Libyan culture to prepare students for democracy.

Libya’s educational system was in theory modeled on the European system, where a difficult exam given after the ninth grade separated the 15% or so who continued on an academic track leading to university from the others, who entered vocational training. For example, in February there were about 120,000 students in Benghazi’s primary schools but just 15,480 in academic secondary schools. The select few who made it into the academic high schools faced a stultifyingly narrow curriculum. According to Wafa Bugaighis, until recently the head of a Benghazi private school, secondary and tertiary education was designed to produce doctors, engineers and lawyers, and not much else.

Even so, Ms. Bugaighis adds, there is a big gap between the few rich (including her family) and the many poor in this supposedly socialist oil state. “Yes, the schools are open to all,” she says. “But the outcome of the system is the problem.” The better-off have long paid for private courses in English—at one point Gadhafi removed foreign languages from the curriculum and their teaching has yet to recover—and even Arabic, to make sure their kids write proper standard Arabic. And the rich could afford to pay for private schools (about $2,000 a year).

Education Minister Sahli, a well-regarded Arabic poet in Libya, recognizes that he is beginning a long-term effort. For the very young, this fall promises much. But many older Libyans must live this moment through their children. Aisha el Sallawi. who has a degree in electrical engineering, apologizes for being unable to speak English: “I still remember the day they burned the English books at my school. I was crying.”

“The Fight For Sabratha” (orig. pub. Weekly Standard blog 8/16/11)

Sunday, September 11th, 2011

http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/fight-sabratha_590281.html

The Fight for Sabratha
Ann Marlowe
August 16, 2011 2:26 PM

Western Libya—Only about thirty volunteers of the three hundred strong Martyr Wasam Qaliyah Brigade are gathered around former Libyan army general Senussi Mohamed as he outlines the plan for the liberation of the coastal city of Sabratha, about 90 kilometers north from Qaddafi’s forces. Crouched in a pleasant pine grove in Jafara Valley, just north of Zintan, they listen intently. This morning, they struck their camp in Jadu, in the western mountains, to join the Sabratha Brigade and volunteers from other cities in what’s planned as a big operation for this Lilliputian war, where groups of 100 or 200 barely trained volunteers skirmish in the streets of rundown cities.

Sabratha is directly ahead, but the men’s main objective is moving westward along the coastline to liberate their coastal hometown of Zwara, a busy port of 47,000 inhabitants, all ethnic Amazigh or Berber. About 100 kilometers west of Tripoli, Zwara is the first town of consequence in Libya as one enters from the Tunisian border, another 65 kilometers west.

Zwara is historically hostile to the Libyan dictatorship, which suppressed its distinctive language and culture. The townsfolk rebelled against Qaddafi on February 18th and remained free until March 14th when Qaddafi’s forces invaded the city with 700 men and 13 tanks. The government forces used Grad missiles and other anti-armor and anti-aircraft weapons, but the city’s fighters killed 16 of them and seized 300 weapons. Qaddafi’s forces killed seven locals and in the ensuing months have jailed more than 200, including women. There are allegations of rape as well.

Many of the inhabitants of Zwara fled to Tunisia, but a lot of men of fighting age went to Jadu, about 120 kilometers south in the western mountains, to train to retake their city. The inhabitants of Jadu are also ethnic Amazigh, and for the Amazigh this war is about two types of independence: not only freedom for Libya, but freedom to maintain their distinct ethnic identity. For decades, Qaddafi banned the teaching, broadcast or speaking of Amazigh, an ancient indigenous language written in an alphabet that looks like pictographs, called tefenagh. Children could not officially receive or use Amazigh names. Here, all the men speak in Amazigh.

There’s some talk of sleeping in their own beds in a night or two. All talk of the impending end of the war. It was reported just twelve hours ago that Qaddafi’s police fled into Tunisia. (They were later replaced and Qaddafi regained control of the border.) Two days earlier, revolutionary brigades captured the larger town of Zawiyah, 60 kilometers to the east and 40 kilometers from Tripoli. They also took Gharian, the largest town in the western mountains, an operation in which about 20 men of the Zwara brigade participated. Both were strategically significant actions. Controlling Gharian means cutting off Tripoli’s access to Algeria—where Qaddafi is said to get troops and munitions—and controlling Zawiyah cuts off Tripoli’s fuel and food supply lines from Tunisia.

This is supposed to be the Zwara fighters’ final departure from Jadu, so the trucks, SUVs, and passenger sedans that will carry them down to the coast today are full of their belongings. Few of the fighters have anything resembling a military kit: The cars are full of duffle bags and wheelies, even a juicer.

Perhaps the fighter with the most unusual skill set is the tall, 43-year-old Dr. Tarik Alatoshi, who received a Ph.D. in geographic information systems from a Chinese university. He spent 11 years in China and speaks the language fluently. Since he fled Zwara and came here in May, Alatoshi has served the Zwara brigade as an unofficial mediator between the excitable young men who want to rush to the fight, and the three professional army officers who command the brigade. He explains that the men don’t care if they die, but that it isn’t good for Libya if they do. They refuse his suggestions to use the body armor and helmets provided by foreign countries. “They think the helmets make them look like old men,” he says. More understandably, they hate the extra weight of the body armor, but, as he says, “If they are running, it is only for a few minutes. Mainly we are fighting from cars.”

Almost all of the men wear green camouflage uniform pants, but Alatoshi explains that these are training uniforms sent by Qatar. The more usefully camouflaged tan combat uniforms from Qatar are in short supply, as are uniform tops. Many wear patriotic t-shirts, some with the flag of the Amazigh.

Those accustomed to the operations of the U.S. Army will notice a few differences. For one, General Mohamed is pointing to a rough sketch on a clipboard that most of the men can’t see. He could have done what American officers often do in field conditions, and sketched a map on the dirt in front of the men. But it seems that he was trained in a much less participatory style of leadership. There is a culture clash here, pitting the extreme autonomy of the volunteers against what seems to have been the top-down culture of the Qaddafi army, and it’s not mediated by NCOs, who seem not to exist. I have never met a sergeant from the regular army in the other volunteer brigades, only officers ranking major and above. From the briefing, it is uncertain whether the general knows where Qaddafi’s forces are in Sabratha, or where the other forces that are supposed to be converging from different sides are to join up.

There is also an issue of numbers. Contrary to the Clausewitzian principle of concentration of forces, the revolutionaries seem to practice maximum dispersal. Some of the rest of the Zwara fighters are already an hour’s drive down in Jalat, southwest of Surman in the parched Jafara Valley, close to the rapidly advancing front line. About twenty others are part of a larger force that recaptured Gharian. And some remain at one of two well organized and fairly comfortable camps at schools in Jadu.

One problem is political: Since the fighters are unpaid volunteers, who can leave if dissatisfied, commanders have to promise or deliver action or an interesting experience in order to retain them. And they are much keener on fighting for their own village than for someone else’s. A group of 500 or 1,000 fighters from different towns’ brigades might be able to effectively intimidate Qaddafi’s forces sufficiently to force an overall retreat from not just Sabratha and Zwara but the whole coast all the way to Tunisia. But instead, platoon and company sized elements will pick and choose their fights.

On the three hour drive down to Sabratha, the men show decent weapons discipline, pointing their assault rifles in the air rather than at each other. But they are very short on ammunition, so short that most have little practice firing their weapons. Luckily, at this stage in the war, Qaddafi’s troops are often as likely to surrender as they are to fight.

There are six to seven fighters per vehicle. Dismounted, they are supposed to fight as a unit. The 300-man brigade’s three professional officers ride in a black Hyundai Tucson SUV. The little convoy begins with the Tucson, two pickup trucks, two passenger sedans, and one more SUV. One of the pickup trucks has a homemade rocket launcher manufactured by a man from nearby Kabaw nicknamed “Rambo.” While we are still in secure territory, the Tucson leads the way. As we approach Surman, a town newly taken—and not completely pacified—by the revolutionaries, the pickup trucks move to the fore.

Abdullah Dinwari, the second highest ranking of the three professional soldiers in the Zwara brigade, says of the rebels, “It is very difficult to work with these people. It is ‘please sit down’ and ‘please stand up.’ An army must be a dictatorship but they like democracy.” It is not encouraging when he says he is unfamiliar with the crude Qatar-supplied assault rifles in our SUV; he’s used to Kalashnikovs. But with five years of Russian training and a position in the special forces, Dinwari is light years ahead of the 19 to 21 year olds who form the bulk of the brigade.

General Mohamed, a tall, dark-skinned, and fit man in his 50s, known simply as Mr. Senussi to the fighters, explains the plan as he drives. We will go down to Surman and reach Jalat by nightfall, camping there before turning left towards Zwara. He says that we must wait for NATO clearance before advancing further. Otherwise our trucks might be bombed by NATO in the mistaken belief we are part of Qaddafi’s forces.

Assam Baka, a former Air Force operations room officer who’s the third highest ranking officer in the brigade, switches off driving duties with the general. When we stop for a bathroom break by a gully, we’re passed by a pickup truck full of captured African Qaddafi soldiers. General Mohamed points to the passenger sedans heading past us to the mountains. He says they are families fleeing Tripoli. Libya is a sparsely populated country, so a steady stream of refugees amounts to a car every five or ten minutes.

Around 1 p.m., the officers make gradual preparations for the front. General Mohamed changes his cheap black sandals for white sneakers, and all the men put their magazines in their assault rifles. We are waiting to meet up with another convoy of Zwara fighters, but the general’s field radio doesn’t work, nor does his Immersat phone.

By 2:30, a plan is announced: Even though we can’t find the rest of the Zwara fighters, we’re going to Sabratha, to join the Sabratha Brigade in retaking the city. The men are thrilled, and there are many cries of “Allahu Akbar!” By 3, we are in the outskirts of

Sabratha. Shops are closed, common during Ramadan in the daylight hours, but there is some civilian traffic, with passengers waving and making the “V” sign or flashing their lights. On a shabby, dusty street of shuttered shops four kilometers from the town center, our convoy pulls into a large open area opposite a huge mosque and a water tower. Everyone gets out of the cars and shouts “Allahu Akbar” since it seems the Sabratha Brigade has done its work.

Suddenly, heavy weapons fire erupts and General Mohamed jumps in the car and drives away along with most of the others, in the direction of the fire, leaving me among a handful of abandoned cars. The fighters who are left on foot motion to me to move forward to the wall of a building where they crouch, trying to figure out where they’re receiving fire from. After a tense ten minutes or so, we break for the main street. The rest of the cars return to park here. The two trucks with homemade antiaircraft guns dart here and there, scouting for Qaddafi troops.

“Qaddafi prisoners!” says one of the fighters, motioning to me to walk fifty yards back in the direction we came to see a pickup truck full of African men in civvies. It wasn’t clear who captured them. As soon as I start photographing the prisoners, gunfire erupts again and everyone falls back to the warehouses.

Just as we run for cover, a 19-year-old fighter from the Sabratha Brigade, Ahmed Sola, whom I met a few weeks ago while visiting their camp, appears out of nowhere with his friend Mansour. It is a trademark “small war” moment. They greet me, pose for photos, and then move toward the sea and the main fight.

At 4 p.m., occasional booms of rocket fire indicate that the fight for Sabratha continues, without the men here having joined it. The general puts some fighters to work with a conveniently nearby bulldozer closing off the main street with two huge dirt piles. This is to make sure that Qaddafi troops or sympathizers can’t hurtle through. Everyone else crouches in the shade or tries to sleep; many got no sleep last night. Supply convoys pass by twice, providing the men with bottled water, a surprising American Army touch. The Libyans are a lot better with logistics than they are with most of the rest of the infrastructure of military life.

The muezzin of the mosque a few blocks away continues a steady stream of inspirational messages, prayers and calls of “Allahu Akbar,” but it’s not clear how the fight for the center of Sabratha—just 8 kilometers from some of the world’s best preserved Roman ruins—is going.

The men aren’t sure if they will be asked to join the battle in the center of Sabratha, retreat, or go on to Zwara perhaps by another route. They scrounge in their cars for stray bullets to load into clips. Some scrutinize bullets, trying to figure out if they are the size they need. Jalul, a thin, 32-year-old civil engineer wearing body armor and a full uniform, says apologetically, “Today is the first time I fired my gun.”

At around 7:30, the Ramadan fast ends, and a handful of locals come out to offer the Zwara fighters pieces of surprisingly good homemade chocolate cake, cookies, dates, and other food. A half hour later, General Mohammed gets some bad news on his satellite phone: Fifty trucks of Qaddafi volunteers are headed to Sabratha, coming via Jumayil, another Qaddafi stronghold 10 kilometers south of Zwara. These so-called volunteers from Mali or Chad are essentially mercenaries, sometimes given Libyan passports in return for fighting for Qaddafi. The revolutionaries’ tenderness toward fellow Libyans does not extend to the volunteers, many of whom are accused of atrocities.

General Mohamed tells the men to retreat, but some of the fighters object vociferously. They want to go on to Zwara, albeit without communications, and possibly at the risk of meeting overwhelming numbers of volunteers. But the general wins this debate. Our small group will return to Mahmiah, an hour south, to spend the night there. Just one truck with an improvised anti-aircraft gun will stay; they drive off to join the Sabratha Brigade with great whoops and shouts of “Allahu Akbar!”

Once we reach Mahmiah, at about 11 p.m., the general decides that we will return all the way to Jadu, which we reach by 3 a.m. “Long day, long war,” he says. The general offers me a room in his personal quarters, which he shares with his three teenaged sons. There’s electricity and I immediately start to charge my Blackberry. But there is no running water and the conditions are squalid. One of his sons comes in with an iPod and asks me if I have a USB charger, a reminder that the family has fallen far from their former middle class existence.

It isn’t until Monday afternoon that the news trickles out that Qaddafi’s forces have fled the center of Sabratha, although there are reports of shelling from outside. Sabratha is now considered free. Monday evening, the Zwara men send me to break the Ramadan fast at a nearby mosque. About fifty mostly middle aged men—almost all refugees from newly liberated Zawiyah—are gathered around tables of donated home cooked food.

Sadeg Allab, a spokesman for the Zawiyah local council, had just returned from a visit to his hometown. He reported that the road from the Zawiyah Brigade’s mountain camp on the coast is secured. But though Zawiyah is considered free, shelling from Tripoli claimed the lives of nine people Monday. Zawiyah is a spread out town of 25-30 square kilometers, he explains, and not all areas are equally secure. His friend Oun Khair—a physicist who perfected his English in his Canadian education—added that they hope to be able to return to live in Zawiyah soon.

Mustafa Marwan, an Egyptian volunteer with the Arab Medical Union (funded here by Mercy USA), reports that the AMU’s five-person trauma team performed 20 major operations on wounded revolutionary fighters between the 10th and 13th of August at the hospital in Zintan, 22 kilometers east of Jadu, where I encountered him checking his email.