FRENCH LESSONS

ALGERIA WAR INFORMS IRAQ

By ANN MARLOWE

PACIFICATION IN ALGERIA 1956-58
RAND CORPORATION, 324 PAGES, $28.50
COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE
BY DAVID GALULA
PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL, 128 PAGES, $29.95
Petraeus: Inspired to move U.S. troops into cities.

TO understand the new American military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan you could download a copy of the Army’s counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24. Or you could read the elegant, entertaining books by French Lt. Col. David Galula that inspired Gen. David Petraeus in producing FM 3-24.

Galula wrote “Pacification in Algeria” in 1963 at the RAND Corporation, followed in 1964 by “Counterinsurgency Warfare” at Harvard. Now, both have been reissued.

“Pacification” tracks Galula’s two years as a company commander in Algeria and the development of his ideas about counterinsurgency into a successful formula soon adopted by the French force in Algeria. “Counterinsurgency Warfare” is military theory, including analysis of the insurgencies in communist China and Algeria.

The questions Galula raises in the gripping “Pacification couldn’t be more current. The French haven’t won any wars in a long time, but they excel at theorizing about them.

Galula’s big idea was simple: to place small numbers of the 100 soldiers under his command in isolated villages, living among the populace. His company was “spread over six posts with 10 to 15 men each.” Galula’s men supervised and funded the building of the area’s first schools, first latrines, garbage pits and street cleaning in their villages.

The top brass didn’t get it. An inspecting general complained, “Your posts are utterly useless, their strength is too small to allow a serious sortie against the guerrillas!” The generals were looking for body counts.

Galula “tried to explain that the very fact that I could disperse my company so much was proof of my success.” He realized that the objective wasn’t to kill terrorists so much as to create an environment in the civilian population where they could not find support.

Galula’s practice mustn’t be mistaken for the nonsense known as “winning hearts and minds,” which suggests bribing the locals into obeying the laws of their own elected government. Galula restored the government’s control over disputed areas and showed the locals that taking the government’s side made sense.

“Pacification” also discusses in grainy detail such issues as the use of torture and the press’ role in counterinsurgency. The Algerian war was the last major conflict fought just before the advent of television, but print journalism had an enormous influence on its conduct.

Happily, the U.S. Army has recognized Galula’s insights. FM 3-24 states that soldiers ought to live in the contested area, “close to the populace. Raiding from remote, secure bases does not work. Movement on foot, sleeping in villages, and night patrolling all seem more dangerous than they are – and they are what ground forces are trained to do.”

Now, practice is catching up with theory, both in Iraq, where American forces are leaving Forward Operating Bases for quarters in the cities, and in Afghanistan.

But for America in Iraq and Afghanistan, as for the French in Algeria, an excellent theory, practiced by inspiring leaders, is nothing without the will to win. By 1960, the Algerian rebels had less than 10,000 men, and most of their weapons were buried for lack of ammunition. Still Charles de Gaulle declared defeat, granting Algeria independence it has yet to put to good use.

Ann Marlowe writes frequently about Afghanistan and the Muslim world.

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